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Abstract
Seed fundraising for ventures often takes place by sequentially approaching potential con-
tributors, whose decisions are observed by other contributors. The fundraising succeeds when
a target number of investments is reached. When a single investment suffices, this setting re-
sembles the classic information cascades model. However, when more than one investment is
needed, the solution is radically different and exhibits surprising complexities. We analyze a
setting where contributors’ levels of information are i.i.d. draws from a known distribution,
and find strategies in equilibrium for all. We show that participants rely on social insurance,
i.e., invest despite having unfavorable private information, relying on future player strategies to
protect them from loss. Delegation is an extreme form of social insurance where a contributor
will unconditionally invest, effectively delegating the decision to future players. In a typical
fundraising, early contributors will invest unconditionally, stopping when the target is “close
enough”, thus de facto delegating the business of determining fundraising success or failure to
the last contributors.
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1 Introduction
Mom and Dad are asked to approve of Son’s latest bright idea, whose wisdom is uncertain to both.
Son will go ahead only if both parents approve. If the idea turns out well, each parent gains an
amount W , while if it is bad, each loses an equal amount. If they do not approve, no one gains or
loses.
The parents are fully rational, and each has an independent binary (good or bad) signal of
the idea’s wisdom, whose value is also binary, and called the state of the world ω (good = 1, bad
= 0). The quality of each signal is, for each parent, the probability that the signal matches the
state of the world. It ranges from 12 , when the signal is uninformative about ω, to 1, when the
signal deterministically reveals it. Each parent’s quality is independently drawn from a quality
distribution whose support is in [12 , 1], and is privately known by the respective parent
1.
Suppose Dad is asked to make a decision first. His decision is observed by Mom, who decides
last. What is the parents’ equilibrium strategy, given a common prior for the state of the world?
This question appears like an elementary exercise in social choice, or in information cascades,
or in crowdfunding, but it hides complexity and elements that are novel and absent from the
aforementioned fields. Chief among them is social insurance, wherein an early agent (Dad, in this
case) relaxes his criteria for participation relying on future agents’ (Mom, in this case) strategies
to protect him against loss. Thus, in the classical information cascades model of [Banerjee, 1992]
and of [Bikhchandani et al., 1992], Dad would approve strictly based on having a private posterior
probability for a good state of the world of at least 50%, as Mom’s future decision is irrelevant for
his. In our problem, Dad would participate even if his posterior is below 50%. This is because even
if, prima facie, he expects loss, he expects Mom’s future decision to weed out more scenarios where
he loses than where he gains. Therefore, his total expectation from participation is positive.
Another element hidden in our small problem we call delegation. This occurs when a player,
usually the first (Dad), assumes so much social insurance that his optimal strategy is to participate
for any signal or quality, making his decision uninformative. This is not the same as the up-cascade
feature of information cascades, where the prior is so favorable that all players participate regardless
of type (although up- and down-cascades are also features of our problem). Rather, the prior is
not favorable enough for both parents to approve automatically, but is suitable for Dad to delegate
the decision to Mom, who, in this case, has to make a solo decision, as Dad’s action carries no
information.
We adopt the usual terminology of information cascades, and Bayesian games: A player’s type
encompasses all her private information. The likelihood of the state of the world ω is the ratio
1The problem is unchanged if the privately-known qualities are merely beliefs. This is because the players are
rational and do not entertain conscious biases.
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Pr[ω=1]
Pr[ω=0] . Herding occurs when a player’s optimal action does not depend on her type. A cascade
occurs when the same herding behavior persists for all future players. An up-cascade is when the
herding is to the a = 1 action, while a down-cascade is when it is to the a = 0 action. The type
model has the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) (see, e.g., [Herrera and Ho¨rner, 2013],
[Smith and Sørensen, 2000]), when inferences from a player’s type on the state of the world are
monotonically increasing with the type.
As we will show, we can roll together, for each player, the private quality of a signal in [12 , 1] and
the private binary signal of ω, into a new type in [0, 1] that obeys MLRP. We will also demonstrate
that the players’ optimal behavior is crucially affected by the range of the quality distribution. We
mark by Q the maximal value in the quality distribution support, and by R the minimal value.
Q = 1 when there is non-zero probability for a type whose signal deterministically reveals the
state of the world. This translates to an MLRP model with unbounded support, which, as usual
in unbounded models (see [Smith and Sørensen, 2000]), precludes herding (because a sufficiently-
informed player’s signal can overcome any prior, no matter how good or bad).
We assume Q < 1, which leads to an MLRP model with bounded support, making herding
and cascades possible. This is because the assumption that there exist players who have perfect
knowledge of the state of the world appears unrealistic to us. Most questions, and especially
predictions (of, e.g., the weather, sporting events, or the success of ventures), have too many
unknowns to be answered exactly. This is borne out by empirical studies (e.g., [Goel et al., 2010],
[Ban and Mansour, 2018]) that indicate that predictions are limited in their accuracy, even if formed
by aggregation of several opinions.
One result emerging from our analysis is that the minimal R is also of significance. R = 12
attaches non-zero probability to a type who is perfectly ignorant of the state of the world. While
not impossible, it is often implausible that a player with skin in the game is perfectly ignorant.
Setting R > 12 sets bounds on that ignorance. This bound also means that every player can trust
future players to have a minimally-informative signal. With uniformly-distributed qualities, we
show that players delegate only when R exceeds a bound, and never delegate for R = 12 , i.e., when
future players may be perfectly ignorant. If the lower bound R and the higher bound Q are not
too close, only early players delegate.
Our Mom and Dad problem is the simplest case of a more general sequential decision problem,
with n players, the approval (now also called investment) of at least B of them needed for a project
to take place, with those who approved subject to gain or loss, depending on the project’s outcome.
Each player gets an independent good/bad signal on the project’s prospects, with varying quality,
i.i.d. drawn from a known distribution, and privately known (or believed) by the player. Players
act sequentially, with their actions, but not their signal or quality, publicly observed.
Our Mom and Dad problem representsB = 2, n = 2, while the classical model of [Banerjee, 1992]
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and [Bikhchandani et al., 1992] has B ≤ 1. The case B = n is a unanimity game, where a project
takes place only if all players approve. The general case, B ≤ n, captures sequential fundraising,
where n potential contributors are sequentially approached for a contribution, and the project takes
place if at least B of them contribute.
Except for unanimity games, the model differs from voting or social choice games, because,
in such, the social choice affects the utility of all players, whatever they voted, while we consider
games where only assenters gain or lose. This distinction disappears in unanimity games since there
are either no dissenters or no utility.
In this paper we develop a model for the general problem, and formulate equations that
are satisfied in equilibrium, then demonstrate interesting economic and game-theoretical aspects
of the solution. We seek a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of our problem, as defined by
[Maskin and Tirole, 2001], where strategies are memoryless and depend only on a payoff-relevant
state. We furthermore adopt a refinement that makes the equilibrium unique, except in isolated
cases, and show that, in the rest, the optimal strategy is pure, unique, and a threshold one, in which
a player invests only if her type is at least equal to a threshold, with indifference to action possible
only at the threshold. We demonstrate the cascade limits: Like in the information-cascades setting,
an up-cascade occurs at public likelihoods above Q1−Q . Unlike the information-cascades setting, a
down-cascade occurs at public likelihoods below
(1−Q
Q
)B
. Therefore the game is not in a cascade for
arbitrarily unfavorable likelihoods, whenever B is large enough. The up-cascade limit also places a
limit on information aggregation in every sequential fundraising, which we show is public likelihood( Q
1−Q
)2
.
In the general case, B ≤ n, except at cascades, solving for equilibrium analytically is mostly
beyond our reach. However, unanimity games B = n, which include the Mom and Dad (B = n = 2)
problem, are generally solvable. Interesting aspects of the equilibrium include
• Depending on the public likelihood, players often, but not always, play the same threshold
strategy. In a sense, they divide the “burden” of vindicating the project equally among
themselves. We show how this is related to a simultaneous version of the game, and show
that players in the sequential game can play unequal thresholds only when the simultaneous
game has more than one equilibrium. We provide a necessary condition for two players to
play different equilibrium strategies.
• For some quality distributions, players never delegate. We give a criterion for this.
• For some quality distributions where players may delegate, only the earliest players delegate.
In these, a unanimity game starts by zero or more early players delegating by investing
regardless of type, in a “reverse” cascade. Unlike in real cascades, this delegation ends before
the last player.
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In addition, we show that, in unanimity games, players always assume social insurance, i.e.,
shade their threshold lower, relying on the strategies of future players. We conjecture that this is
true for non-unanimity games (B < n) too.
1.1 Related Work
Our model is rooted within two lines of literature: (1) the literature of information cascades, and
(2) the theoretical study of sequential fundraising.
The information cascades literature originated from the canonical work of [Banerjee, 1992,
Bikhchandani et al., 1992] who studied the question of information aggregation in settings where
partly informed agents act sequentially. Agents observe the information revealed by actions taken
by previous agents. Their conclusion was that, eventually, the optimal action an agent will take
will be identical to the previous action, even when this action contradicts her own private informa-
tion. This phenomenon is called herding. Additionally, assuming that agents are equally informed,
it persists with future agents in a cascade. When herding occurs, the agent’s action is no longer
informative, thus future agents can no longer learn. A second question is therefore, what is the prob-
ability that the agents herd on the correct alternative? [Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1992]
studied a model with a binary signal and showed that (1) Herding always occurs in finite time;
(2) There is always a positive probability that the agents herd on the wrong alternative. In a
follow-up work, [Smith and Sørensen, 2000] studied a similar model, only with a general signal
structure and showed that learning can occur if and only if signals are unbounded in their qual-
ity. Subsequent work studied the robustness of these results on various observational structures
[Acemoglu et al., 2011, Herrera and Ho¨rner, 2013], various incentive schemes [Mueller-frank, 2012,
Arieli et al., 2019a, Moscarini and Ottaviani, 2001], and even cases where agents are affected by
congestion [Eyster et al., 2013]. One common feature of these, and the vast majority of existing
work, is that the utility of an agent depends solely on actions taken in the past and the information
available in the present. We extend this to where agents’ utility is affected by the action of fu-
ture arrivals. Two rare examples of the introduction of forward-looking agents into an information
cascade framework can be seen in [Arieli et al., 2019b, Smith et al., 2017]. In [Arieli et al., 2019b],
the agents choose between strategically priced alternatives. However, even in [Arieli et al., 2019b],
the farsighted agents are the firms, while the consumers who potentially herd are myopic. In
[Smith et al., 2017], a social planner assigns actions to agents in order to maximize the discounted
sum of agent utilities. To the best of our knowledge, we are first to successfully characterize an equi-
librium in the setting of information cascades in which the agents themselves are forward-looking.
The theory of incentives in sequential fundraising processes has been gaining traction with the
rise of crowdfunding platforms and venture capital funds. The literature’s lion share focuses on
the interaction with the entrepreneur, studying questions of moral hazard, number of investments,
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and the pace at which investments occur. In [Hellmann and Thiele, 2015], the authors study the
interplay between early contributors (angels) and later ones (venture capital markets). The au-
thors present a model in which the fundraising process comprises two stages. The initial funding
is raised by angels. Following the results from this stage, additional funds are raised from ven-
ture capital. The authors use a “costly search model” to find an equilibrium in both markets.
In their model, VC investment occurs only if the amount raised from angels surpasses a certain
threshold, thus signalling a high-value investment. Angels, who know that the process succeeds
only if favorable information is uncovered, have incentives to invest in a priori riskier investments.
In equilibrium, both forces are balanced and result in sub-optimal entrepreneur market size. In
[Bergemann and Hege, 2004] the authors study the relationship between an investor and an en-
trepreneur. They present a repeated moral hazard game in which an entrepreneur raises funds
from an investor. After raising an investment, the entrepreneur decides which part of it is allocated
to the company and which is diverted to her own goals. The authors compare between two scenar-
ios, one where investors can monitor the entrepreneur decision and one where they cannot. The
lack of information creates a scenario in which the investor is implicitly committed to a stopping
time, which is invariant to the entrepreneur interim behavior. In [Bergemann et al., 2008], investors
decide sequentially over the pace at which a venture is funded. They find that in this scenario,
investment pace starts slowly and accelerates with favorable information. The work closest to ours
is [Halac et al., ]. The model presented in [Halac et al., ] comprises agents who have heterogeneous
investment size, and act sequentially and decide whether to invest in a firm. The firm can alter
its revenue stream, which determines the investment attractability. They show that the optimal
firm strategy increases the inequality between the returns of large investors and smaller ones. We
supplement [Bergemann et al., 2008, Bergemann and Hege, 2004] by requiring investments to ini-
tiate the process, thus investors cannot alter their decision based on interim output. We extend
[Hellmann and Thiele, 2015] to a case of more than two rounds of investment. We supplement
[Halac et al., ] as in our model, agents are aware of the exact amount of participation required,
and thus can make inferences from the decision of the pivotal investor, who, in turn, knows she is
pivotal. We show that the pivotal nature of the latter plays a major role in her decision and on the
efficiency in which information is aggregated, and allow for both social insurance and delegation
which were unobserved in previous work.
Another related line of work is the literature that studies crowdfunding [Alaei et al., 2016,
Strausz, 2017, Arieli et al., 2018]. In [Strausz, 2017], the author studied the robustness of crowd-
funding campaigns to moral hazard and charaterizes the conditions under which crowdfunding
campaigns are resilient to entrepreneurial abuse. Alaei et. al. [Alaei et al., 2016] presented a
model where agents’ actions depend on past actions and also on their estimation of what future
agents will do. Their setting, motivated by crowdfunding campaigns, has agents with private val-
uations, and the public information is solely the number of adoptions. We present a model where
agents have a noisy signal on quality. In [Alaei et al., 2016]’s model, the risk facing consumers is
6
to invest in a failed campaign due to contribution costs. In ours the risk is due to a poor product.
Due to this, our model can be applied to other cases, such as sequential voting and group buy.
[Arieli et al., 2018] presented a static model of crowdfunding, in which agent signals are binary, and
show that agent participation is affected by the decision of their colleagues, when the population
size is sufficiently large. They use the term “social insurance”, roughly in the meaning used in this
paper. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dynamic model that studies this aspect, and
gives results on equilibrium strategies, efficiency, and even yields counterintuitive results. This is
an addition to previous literature and is empirically supported in crowdfunding [Mollick, 2014].
The paper is organized as follows. Our model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes and
solves the problem up to an equilibrium characterization. In Section 4 we demonstrate properties
of the solution in cases of interest and in the general case. We offer conclusions and general remarks
in Section 5.
2 Model
n0 players, labeled 1, 2, . . . , n0, need to take a joint decision on a project. Each has two possible
actions, 1 “invest” and 0 “decline”. Player 1 makes a public decision first, followed by player
2, 3 . . . . Player i’s action is marked ai. The project takes place only if at least B0 players invest,
i.e., if a1 + . . .+ an0 ≥ B0.
The state of the world, ω, is either 1 (project is “good”), or 0 (project is“bad”).
If the project does not take place, all player utilities are zero. If the project does take place,
each player who invested gets utility 2ω − 1, while players who declined have zero utility.2
Each player receives a private, noisy signal si ∈ {0, 1} of ω. Signals are mutually independent,
conditionally on ω. The probability that the signal is correct (si = ω) is individual to the player,
called the signal quality and marked qi. With probability 1 − qi, the signal is wrong (si = 1 − ω).
Qualities are i.i.d. samples from a distribution q ∼ ∆([R,Q]) where 12 ≤ R < Q < 1. The
distribution has piecewise-continuous density fq(x) with no atoms, and fq(R) > 0, fq(Q) > 0.
Each player privately knows her quality.
The prior likelihood of the state of the world, marked L0, is publicly known. It is defined
L0 :=
Pr[ω = 1]
Pr[ω = 0]
A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the game is sought. This means a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) in Markovian strategies, as defined by [Maskin and Tirole, 2001]. The strategy
2A rescaling of likelihoods will handle the case where upside and downside are not equal.
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of each player
S : R>0 × N× N× [1−Q, 1−R] ∪ [R,Q] 7→ ∆({0, 1})
is accordingly a probability distribution over the action space {0, 1}, which is a function of the
payoff-relevant state (L,B, n), and of the player’s privately-known type t, defined below, the state
comprising
• L: The current public likelihood of ω.
• B: The number of investments still needed for completion.
• n: The number of players still to make a decision. Note that this encodes the player’s identity
i := n0 − n+ 1.
In accordance with the Markov property, each state (L,B, n) may be considered the starting
point of the fundraising, in which the initial state (L0, B0, n0) is irrelevant.
A player’s type consists of her private information, i.e., the pair (qi, si). For each player i, we
roll this pair into a single real number ti, defined
ti =
{
qi si = 1
1− qi si = 0
(1)
so that Pr[ω = 1|ti] = ti. Note that ti’s support is [1−Q, 1−R] ∪ [R,Q].
In addition, we make the following tie-breaking refinement:3 When a player has several strategies
that are tied for having optimal utility expectation, the player must play a mixed strategy in which
at least two of the tied strategies are played with a probability not less than , a fixed parameter,
that is positive but arbitrarily small.
3 Analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
The history of player i, hi−1 ∈ {0, 1}i−1 is the list of actions of previous players hi−1 := (a1, . . . , ai−1)
(h0 is an empty list).
Mark by Li the public likelihood of the state of the world after player i’s action, inferred from
L0 and hi, i.e.
Li :=
Pr[ω = 1|hi]
Pr[ω = 0|hi] (2)
3Despite some similarities, our refinement is not Selten’s Trembling-Hand Perfection. Similar tie-breaking mech-
anisms have been used in the context of dynamic analysis. See, for example, the Obfuscation Principle presented in
[Ely, 2017]. There, a social planner declares agent strategies before the game commences.
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The private likelihood of a player, given her privately-known type (as the type and the history
are mutually independent), is
Pr[ω = 1|hi−1, ti]
Pr[ω = 0|hi−1, ti] =
Pr[ω = 1|hi−1]
Pr[ω = 0|hi−1]
Pr[ω = 1|ti]
Pr[ω = 0|ti] = Li−1
ti
1− t1 (3)
We will show (Corollary 3) that, except for irregular states, defined below, there is a unique
MPE, and equilibrium strategies are pure threshold strategies, i.e., players invest if their type is
larger than the threshold, decline if below it, and are possibly indifferent if their type is equal to
the threshold. The strategy is therefore represented by a function4
σ : R>0 × N× N 7→ [1−Q, 1−R] ∪ [R,Q]
where S(L,B, n, t) = 1 if σ(L,B, n) < t and S(L,B, n, t) = 0 if σ(L,B, n) > t.
3.2 The Case B ≤ 1: Information Cascades
When B ≤ 1 we are in a situation similar to that described in the classical model of [Banerjee, 1992,
Bikhchandani et al., 1992]: The project has already been decided on, or will be if the current player
invests. Therefore the behavior of future players has no bearing on the current player’s strategy:
There is no social insurance, and the player decides strictly based on her private likelihood (3),
investing when it is > 1 and declining when it is < 1.
Proposition 1 (B ≤ 1). Given B ≤ 1
σ(L,B, n) =
1
1 + L
(4)
Proof. If the number of investments needed is reached or exceeded, the probability for completion
is 1. A player with type t has expectation for investing
U(L,B, n, t) = Pr[ω = 1|L, t]− Pr[ω = 0|L, t] =
(
1− 1
1 + L t1−t
)
− 1
1 + L t1−t
which is non-negative iff L t1−t ≥ 1, i.e., when t ≥ 11+L .
3.3 Probability of Completion
We will show that a player’s optimal strategy critically depends on the probability of completion,
which we now define.
In an n-player game, let φ = (φ1, . . . , φn) be a profile of strategies in MPE for each player.
4As no two players can be in the same state, we use a common strategy function σ.
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Define the probability of completion, piφω (L,B, n) as the probability that the project takes place
(i.e., the fundraising completes) when the state of the world is ω ∈ {0, 1} and the players play their
strategies in φ, given public likelihood L, B outstanding investments and n remaining players.
Clearly, piφω (L,B, n) = 0 when B > n and pi
φ
ω (L,B, n) = 1 when B ≤ 0, for any L, ω and φ.
These are examples of states where the probability of completion does not depend on the
strategy profile. In general, if there is a unique MPE, there is a unique probability of completion,
which we mark simply piω(L,B, n). We shall later derive a recurrence equation for it in Corollary
2.
States (L,B, n) where there are multiple MPE’s are called irregular, and are excluded from
our discussion. We later (Section 3.8) characterize when a state is irregular, and show why it is
reasonable to not consider them.
Let φ1 be some Markovian strategy that the first player plays in state (L,B, n). It depends on
the player’s private type. Other players, not knowing the first player’s type, make inferences based
on their knowledge of φ1. Let the type-independent probability that the player declines under φ1
and state of the world ω be marked Fω(φ1):
5 By Bayes’ rule, if the player invests, the posterior
likelihood changes to
L+ := L
1− F1(φ1)
1− F0(φ1) (5)
and the state changes to (L+, B − 1, n − 1), while if the player declines, the posterior likelihood
changes, by Bayes’ rule, to
L− := L
F1(φ1)
F0(φ1)
(6)
and the state changes to (L−, B, n− 1).
If neither of these two states are irregular, there is a well-defined probability of completion for
every possible action of the player. Thus, the probability of completion under φ1, which we mark
piφ1ω (L,B, n), is well-defined, equalling
piφ1ω (L,B, n) = [1− Fω(φ1)]piω
(
L
1− F1(φ1)
1− F0(φ1) , B − 1, n− 1
)
+ Fω(φ1)piω
(
L
F1(φ1)
F0(φ1)
, B, n− 1) (7)
3.4 Equilibrium Strategies are Threshold Strategies
We now prove that the only strategies that are played in MPE are threshold strategies.
For x ∈ (0, 1), we define S(x) as a strategy with threshold x, investing for every type > x,
declining for every type < x, and possibly indifferent for type = x.
5In a slight abuse of notation, we shall later (Section 3.5) intentionally reuse F (·) as the c.d.f. of the type
distribution, once we have proven that the only strategies that need be considered are threshold strategies.
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Theorem 1 (Threshold Strategy). Excluding irregular states (L,B, n), let φ := (φ1, . . . , φn) be an
MPE with public likelihood L, B outstanding investments, and n remaining players. Then φ1 is a
threshold strategy S(x), where x is not necessarily a type in [1−Q, 1−R] ∪ [R,Q].
Proof. Let a player have a type t with public likelihood L, B outstanding investments and n
remaining players. Her private posterior likelihood L′ is, by (3), L t1−t , and her probability for
ω = 0 is 11+L′ =
1
1+L t
1−t
.
Let the type-independent probability for declining under φ1 be Fω(φ1). The posterior likelihood
from investing, L+, is given in (5). L+ is independent of t, since the type is private and unobserved.
So, If the player invests, her expectation, marked Uφ1(L,B, n, t), is
Uφ1(L,B, n, t) = Pr[ω = 1|L, t]pi1(L+, B − 1, n− 1)− Pr[ω = 0|L, t]pi0(L+, B − 1, n− 1)
=
(
1− 1
1 + L t1−t
)
pi1(L
+, B − 1, n− 1)− 1
1 + L t1−t
pi0(L
+, B − 1, n− 1) (8)
Uφ1(L,B, n, t) is non-negative iff
L
t
1− t ≥
pi0(L
+, B − 1, n− 1)
pi1(L+, B − 1, n− 1) (9)
The right-hand side of (9) does not depend on type t, while the left-hand side increases with
increasing t, and varies continuously from 0 to ∞ when t varies from 0 to 1. It follows
1. By the mean-value theorem, there exists a t = x where (9) holds with equality.
2. If φ1 calls for declining at any t > x, the player will deviate, as U
φ1(L,B, n, t) > 0, and so
the strategy is not playable in equilibrium.
3. If φ1 calls for investing at any t < x, the player will deviate, as U
φ1(L,B, n, t) < 0, and so
the strategy is not playable in equilibrium.
Therefore the only strategies playable in equilibrium are threshold strategies S(x) where for t = x
(9) holds with equality.
3.5 Inferences from Actions in Threshold Strategies
At equilibrium, by Theorem 1, all players play threshold strategies, which are commonly known. A
player’s type is not observable, but the fact that she invested proves that her type is greater than
her threshold, while if she declined, the inference is that her type is below the threshold. Since these
events have, a priori, different conditional probabilities for each state of the world ω, observing the
action leads, by Bayes’ rule, to an updated public likelihood of ω.
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We derive from fq(x), the quality density function, the distribution of type t, a random variable
with support in [1−Q, 1− R] ∪ [R,Q], conditional on ω, with density fω(y) and c.d.f. Fω(y). By
(1) and the definition of the quality q
f1(y) =
{
yfq(y) y ∈ [12 , Q]
yfq(1− y) y ∈ [1−Q, 12 ]
(10)
f0(y) =
{
(1− y)fq(y) y ∈ [12 , Q]
(1− y)fq(1− y) y ∈ [1−Q, 12 ]
(11)
Thus
f1(y)
f0(y)
=
y
1− y (12)
regardless of fq(·), and is monotonically increasing in y, so type distributions always have the
MLRP property.
For x ≥ Q the undefined 1−F1(x)1−F0(x) = 00 is taken to be the limit by L’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
x→Q
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) =
Q
1−Q (13)
For x ≤ 1−Q, the undefined F1(x)F0(x) = 00 is taken to be the limit by L’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
x→1−Q
F1(x)
F0(x)
=
1−Q
Q
(14)
The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 1. 1−F1(x)1−F0(x) and
F1(x)
F0(x)
are monotonically increasing in x.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since F1(1) = F0(1) = 1 we deduce from Lemma 1 first-order stochastic dominance
F0(x) ≥ F1(x) (15)
with equality only when x /∈ (1−Q,Q).
Thus, observing an investment (ai = 1) by player i, whose threshold strategy is x, when the
prior public likelihood is L, and the prior probability for ω = 1 is λ = L1+L , we derive by Bayes’
rule
Pr[ω = 1|ai = 1] = λPr[ai = 1|ω = 1]
λPr[ai = 1|ω = 1] + (1− λ) Pr[ai = 1|ω = 0]
=
1
1 + 1−λλ
Pr[ai=1|ω=0]
Pr[ai=1|ω=1]
=
1
1 + 1L
1−F0(x)
1−F1(x)
(16)
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From which we conclude that the posterior public likelihood L+(L, x) inferred from investment
is
L+(L, x) :=
Pr[ω = 1|ai = 1]
Pr[ω = 0|ai = 1] = L
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) (17)
Similarly, the posterior public likelihood L−(L, x) inferred from a decline is
L−(L, x) :=
Pr[ω = 1|ai = 0]
Pr[ω = 0|ai = 0] = L
F1(x)
F0(x)
. (18)
Due to stochastic dominance (15), we have, for every L, x
L−(L, x) ≤ L ≤ L+(L, x).
Using the above, Theorem 1, and (9) in its proof, we derive a condition which is fulfilled by
every threshold strategy played in MPE.
Corollary 1 (Threshold Indifference Condition). In equilibrium, a threshold x strategy satisfies
L
x
1− x =
pi0
(
L1−F1(x)1−F0(x) , B − 1, n− 1
)
pi1
(
L1−F1(x)1−F0(x) , B − 1, n− 1
) (19)
We now derive a recurrence equation for the probability of completion piω.
Corollary 2 (Probability of Completion). Except at irregular states (L,B, n), the probability of
completion is continuous in L, equalling
piω(L,B, n) =

1 B ≤ 0
0 n ≤ 0 ∧B > 0[
1− Fω(x)
]
piω
(
L 1−F1(x)
1−F0(x) , B − 1, n− 1
)
+ Fω(x)piω
(
LF1(x)
F0(x)
, B, n− 1) otherwise (20)
Proof. This follows from (7) for a threshold strategy φ1 = S(x), that is played in a unique MPE.
Fω(x) is continuous, so by induction on n, using (20), piω is continuous in L, wherever it is well-
defined.
3.6 The Equilibrium Strategy
In previous sections we show that, in MPE, a player plays a threshold strategy where the threshold
satisfies (19). If (19) has a single solution x, this single solution is the player’s strategy in MPE.
But, If there are multiple x’s satisfying (19), she must choose.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Strategy). In MPE, a player’s strategy is a Markovian strategy whose
type-independent utility expectation is not exceeded by any other Markovian strategy.
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Proof. In a general game, in MPE a player plays a strategy that is a function of the payoff-relevant
state, and is a best response to the strategies of all concurrent and future players. The strategy
does not depend on the strategies of past players, as their strategies, to the extent that they are
payoff-relevant, are already encompassed in the state.
In the sequential fundraising a player has no concurrent players. A playable strategy is a strategy
from which the player will not deviate for any type. The player’s optimal choice is the playable
strategy that has maximal utility expectation before she knows her type, given the state and the
strategies of future players. No simultaneous change of strategy by future players is implied by this
strategy choice, since, for future players the current player is a past player whose strategy does not
affect theirs.6
The type-independent utility expectation is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Utility Expectation). Excluding irregular states (L,B, n), the type-independent
utility expectation US(x)(L,B, n) for a strategy S(x) is
US(x)(L,B, n) =
L
1 + L
[1− F1(x)]pi1
(
L
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) , B − 1, n− 1
)
− 1
1 + L
[1− F0(x)]pi0
(
L
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) , B − 1, n− 1
)
. (21)
Proof. The expectation for declining is 0, so US(x)(L,B, n) is the expectation for the remaining
action, investing. The probability that the player invests is 1− Fω(x), and so, when ω = 1, which
occurs with probability L1+L , the player gains 1 with probability
[1− F1(x)]pi1
(
L
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) , B − 1, n− 1
)
Similarly, when ω = 0, which occurs with probability 11+L , the player loses 1 with probability
[1− F0(x)]pi0
(
L
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) , B − 1, n− 1
)
3.7 Equally-Optimal Strategies
When a player has several strategies with maximal type-independent utility expectation, we show
that the player nevertheless prefers one of these strategies, when we assume, according to our
model’s refinement, that the player always mixes between these strategies.
6This argument would not work in an SPE/PBE solution concept, where a player’s strategy is a best response to
all other strategies, past or present.
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Proposition 4 (Tie-Breaking Equally-Optimal Strategies). Excluding irregular states (L,B, n),
given strategies S(x1), . . . ,S(xk) with equal type-independent utility expectation, a player who mixes
between the strategies, assigning probability at least  > 0 to at least two of them, maximizes
her utility expectation by assigning maximal probability 1 −  to some S(xi) that maximizes the
discriminator
D(xi) := max
j∈[n],j 6=i
{
Lpi1
(
L
1− F1(xi)
1− F0(xi) , B − 1, n− 1
)
[1− F1(xj)]− pi0
(
L
1− F1(xi)
1− F0(xi) , B − 1, n− 1
)
[1− F0(xj)]
}
(22)
Proof. See Appendix.
3.8 Equilibrium Characterization and Irregular States
We summarize the above sections with a characterization of the MPE of a sequential fundraising.
Corollary 3 (Equilibrium Characterization). Except at irregular states (L,B, n), at public likeli-
hood L, B investments outstanding and n players remaining, there is a unique pure MPE in which,
in every subgame, all players play threshold strategies. The playable threshold strategies S(x) are
those that satisfy (19), and the MPE strategy is the one with a highest type-independent utility
expectation, as given in (21), where, in case of equality in utility expectations, the strategy with
highest value of (22) is played in MPE. The state is irregular if (22) fails to discriminate between
two or more equally-optimal strategies in any subgame.
As the corollary states, an irregular state is one where any subgame has multiple MPE’s.
Consequently, the following is a recursive characterization of these states.
Corollary 4 (Irregular States). The state (L,B, n) is irregular
1. Never, for B ≤ 1.
2. If it has multiple MPE’s, with several equally-optimal strategies whose discriminators (22)
are equal.
3. If it has an MPE where the first player plays S(x), and any of the states (L1−F1(x)1−F0(x) , B−1, n−1)
or (LF1(x)F0(x) , B, n− 1) is irregular.
The irregular states ultimately depend on the quality distribution q, but this characterization
shows why they are most probably rare, finite in number for any bounded n, and often do not occur
at all, though this may be hard to prove.
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4 Solution Properties
4.1 Herding and Cascades
Herding describes a situation where all types have the same optimal action. A cascade occurs
when herding persists among players, so that when a cascade starts, all future players decline
(down-cascade) or all invest (up-cascade).
An up-cascade occurs wherever the public likelihood is at least Q1−Q .
Theorem 2 (Up-Cascade). For every B,n and B ≤ n, σ(L,B, n) ≤ 1 − Q and an up-cascade is
in progress iff L ≥ Q1−Q .
Proof. An up-cascade occurs iff the probability of completion is 1. We prove that piω(L,B, n) = 1
when L ≥ Q1−Q by induction on B. For B = 0 this is true for any L. Assume the theorem true up to
B − 1. Then, a threshold strategy x must satisfy, by (19) and the induction hypothesis L x1−x = 1.
So
Q
1−Q ≤ L =
1− x
x
Thus x ≤ 1−Q.
At the opposite end, σ(L,B, n) ≥ Q for a herd of decliners. Since the expectation of such a
strategy is 0, it can be optimal only if it is unique. Thus from (19)
Corollary 5 (Herd Decline). σ(L,B, n) ≥ Q, i.e., declining is optimal for all types iff
L
Q
1−Q ≤
pi0(L
Q
1−Q , B − 1, n− 1)
pi1(L
Q
1−Q , B − 1, n− 1)
In a down-cascade, all remaining players decline. Using Corollary 5 repeatedly we get
Corollary 6 (Down-Cascade). For every B,n and B ≤ n, σ(L,B, n) ≥ Q and a down-cascade is
in progress iff L ≤
(
1−Q
Q
)B
.
For herding on investments, a necessary condition is (19) with x ≤ 1 − Q. It is not sufficient,
as it may not have maximal utility expectation.
Corollary 7 (Herd Invest). If σ(L,B, n) ≤ 1−Q then
L
1−Q
Q
≥ pi0(L,B − 1, n− 1)
pi1(L,B − 1, n− 1)
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4.2 Information Aggregation
Information aggregation, or learning, occurs when the state of the world ω becomes known with
higher probability, or likelihood. So we ask, what is the public likelihood Lend := Ln, at completion
of the fundraising?
To bound Lend, we observe that information aggregation stops in an up-cascade. Therefore,
the public likelihood before the last player’s action Ln−1 is bounded above by Q1−Q , the up-cascade
limit by Theorem 2. The inference from the last player’s investment is bounded by Q1−Q , by (13)
and Lemma 1. It follows
Corollary 8 (Learning Bound). Let B = n. In equilibrium, Lend <
(
Q
1−Q
)2
.
Furthermore, if the quality distribution is such that cascades cannot start (see below, the
condition of Theorem 4(1)), then the bound is even lower: Lend <
Q
1−Q .
4.3 Example: Uniformly-Dense Qualities
The simplest assumption we can make about the distribution of qualities is that they are uniformly
distributed between their lower bound R and upper bound Q. Here, we work out the resulting
distributions and player behavior in some sequential fundraising games.
Let qualities be uniformly dense, i.e., for 12 ≤ R < Q < 1
fq(y) =
{
1
Q−R y ∈ [R,Q]
0 otherwise
(23)
Substituting (23) in (10) and (11), we have f1(y) =
y
Q−R , and f0(y) =
1−y
Q−R , so, for y ∈ [1−Q,Q]
F1(y) =
y∫
1−Q
f1(z)dz =

y2−(1−Q)2
2(Q−R) y ≤ 1−R
1− Q+R2 1−R ≤ y ≤ R
1− Q2−y22(Q−R) y ≥ R
(24)
F0(y) =
y∫
1−Q
f0(z)dz =

Q2−(1−y)2
2(Q−R) y ≤ 1−R
Q+R
2 1−R ≤ y ≤ R
1− (1−y)2−(1−Q)22(Q−R) y ≥ R
(25)
We use this example distribution to demonstrate several facts:
1. In the information cascades setting (B ≤ 1), some quality distributions allow cascades to
start, while in others, if the prior is not a priori a cascade (i.e. if 1−QQ < L <
Q
1−Q), a
cascade never starts. We shall later (Section 4.4.3) show that this property is intimately tied
to delegation in sequential fundraising.
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Figure 1: n = B = 2, q ∼ U(0.5, 0.8) Figure 2: n = B = 2, q ∼ U(0.65, 0.8)
Figure 3: n = B = 2, q ∼ U(0.75, 0.8) Figure 4: n = B = 4, q ∼ U(0.65, 0.8)
Proposition 5 (MinimumR for Cascades). When qualities are uniformly distributed U(R,Q),
cascades cannot start in the information cascades setting (B ≤ 1) when R = 12 . For each Q
there is a minimal Rmin >
1
2 , where cascades are possible iff R ≥ Rmin.
Proof. See Appendix.
2. We plot solutions of the Mom-and-Dad problem (B = n = 2) for this uniformly-distributed
qualities withQ = 0.8, R = 0.5 (Figure 1), Q = 0.8, R = 0.65 (Figure 2) andQ = 0.8, R = 0.75
(Figure 3). We also plot the solution for 4 players (B = n = 4) with Q = 0.8, R = 0.65 (Figure
4). Since in most of the range, the players play equal thresholds, represented as colored bars,
the plots appear to have a color mixture effect.
All thresholds below 1−Q (herd invest, or delegate) are equivalent, as are all thresholds in the
range [1−R,R] (invest on s = 1), since they fall outside the type support [1−Q, 1−R]∪[R,Q].
Their different values reflect a different point of indifference in (19).
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In the first plot, Q = 0.8, R = 0.5, the two parents always play the same threshold strategies,
and no delegation ever takes place. In the 2nd and 3rd, Q = 0.8, R = 0.65 and Q =
0.8, R = 0.75, the parents play different thresholds in part of the public likelihood range. For
Q = 0.8, R = 0.65, Dad always plays a threshold equal or lower to Mom’s (and so is the only
one to delegate), while for Q = 0.8, R = 0.75, both parents may play the lower threshold, and
both may delegate.
In Figure 4, the players play increasingly high thresholds from first (x1) to last (x4), with
delegation by early players only, same as for the B = n = 2 solution for the same quality
distribution (Figure 2).
3. The threshold strategy can be non-monotonic. This is demonstrated by Q = 0.8, R = 0.65
(Figure 2), where, as the plot shows, the first player (Dad) has a non-monotonicity in his
threshold at L ' 2.2.
4.4 Unanimity Decision
In this section we consider equilibrium behavior in unanimity games.
4.4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
The equilibrium characterization given in Corollary 3 takes a special form in unanimity games.
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium Characterization). Let B = n. Except at irregular states (L,B, n),
let x1, . . . , xn be the thresholds of the MPE strategies for each player. Then,
The probability of completion is
piω(L,B, n) =
n∏
k=1
[1− Fω(xk)] (26)
and for every i
L
xi
1− xi =
∏
k∈[n],k 6=i
1− F0(xk)
1− F1(xk) (27)
The strategies S(x1), . . . ,S(xn) have equally-maximal utility expectation
US(xi)(L,B, n) =
L
1 + L
n∏
k=1
[1− F1(xk)]− 1
1 + L
n∏
k=1
[1− F0(xk)] (28)
with S(x1) having the largest discriminator, which, for S(xi) is
D(xi) = max j ∈ [n], j 6= i
{
L
1− F1(xj)
1− F1(xi)
n∏
k=1
[1− F1(xk)]− 1− F0(xj)
1− F0(xi)
n∏
k=1
[1− F0(xk)]
}
(29)
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Proof. (26) follows from the fact that the fundraising completes iff all players invest.
Player i see public liklihood Li−1 = L
∏
k∈[n],k<i
1−F1(xk)
1−F0(xk) , and her threshold indifference (19)
implies Li−1 xi1−xi =
pi0(Li,B−i,n−i)
pi1(Li,B−i,n−i) , from which (27) follows.
For each i ∈ [n], L(xi), i ∈ [n], is playable by the first player, because the threshold indifference
condition (27) holds under every permutation of the thresholds. Furthermore, expectation (21) for
the unanimity game is (28), due to (26), and is symmetric under permutation of the thresholds, so
every S(xi) has the same utility expectation. This symmetry is broken by the discriminator (22),
which, in the unanimity game takes the form (29), due to (26).
4.4.2 Social Insurance
We show that players in unanimity games always assume social insurance, meaning that, given the
same public likelihood, a player shades her threshold lower than would be played in a single-player
game (the information-cascades setting with B ≤ 1), i.e., that for every L, n σ(L, n, n) ≤ σ(L, 1, 1).
Indeed, we get the following, stronger result,
Theorem 3 (Social Insurance). Let B = n, and let S(xi) be the strategy in MPE of player i ∈ [n]
with prior likelihood L. In equilibrium xi ≤ σ(L, 1, 1) with equality only for the last player or in a
cascade.
Proof. Let the thresholds of the players in MPE be x1, . . . , xn. By (27)
L
x1
1− x1 =
n∏
i=2
1− F0(xi)
1− F1(xi) (30)
From (15), 1−F0(x)1−F1(x) ≤ 1, which is strict except at cascades. So, from (30) L
x1
1−x1 ≤ 1, and
consequently x1 ≤ 11+L , lower than the threshold played for a single player, by Proposition 1, and
strictly so except at cascades.
4.4.3 Delegation
An extreme form of social insurance is delegation, defined as herding on investment when not in a
cascade. The following theorem summarizes properties of delegation.
Theorem 4 (Delegation). Let B = n. Except at irregular states (L,B, n), let x1, . . . , xn be the
thresholds of the MPE strategies for each player. In equilibrium,
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1. In a quality distribution q, delegation takes place, for some L, iff there exists x ∈ (1−Q, 12)
for which
1− x
x
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) ≥
Q
1−Q (31)
which is also the necessary and sufficient condition that, under q, up-cascades can start in
the information-cascades setting.
2. If any player delegates (has threshold ≤ 1−Q when L < Q1−Q), then for all players j, xj ≤ 12 .
3. In a quality distribution q, only the earliest players delegate iff for every x satisfying (31)
(1− x)[1− F1(x)]2 − x[1− F0(x)]2 > 1− 2x
4. In a quality distribution q, only the latest players delegate iff for every x satisfying (31)
(1− x)[1− F1(x)]2 − x[1− F0(x)]2 < 1− 2x
Proof. See Appendix.
For uniformly-distributed qualities (see Section 4.3), Theorem 4, in conjunction with Proposition
5, shows that players never delegate for R = 12 (exemplified in Figure 1), but may delegate starting
at some minimum R (as shown in Figures 2-4). This means that, at least for uniform distributions,
players delegate only when they can expect future players to have sufficiently accurate signals.
Quality distributions where delegation is by early players only (following Theorem 4(3)) are
common (shown in 3 out 4 of Figures 1-4), and exhibit a time reversal of sorts: While in the
information cascades setting an up-cascade might start after several players invested, in the se-
quential fundraising game players pre-empt and avert this possibility by delegating. Whenever a
player’s approval with given threshold x would trigger an up-cascade in the information cascades
setting, in our fundraising setting all previous players would delegate before such a strategy x
player. Furthermore, they have “reverse” cascades, wherein herding takes place from some player
backwards.
Corollary 9 (Reverse cascade). Where Theorem 4(3) holds, if σ(L,B, n) ≤ 1−Q then σ(L,B +
k, n+ k) ≤ 1−Q for every positive integer k.
Another consequence is that up-cascades cannot start before the fundraising completes.
Corollary 10 (No Cascades). Where Theorem 4(3) holds, in equilibrium, an up-cascade does not
start before all players played.
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4.4.4 When are Thresholds Equal?
Consider the unanimity game B = n played simultaneously rather than sequentially. All players
are in a perfectly-symmetrical situation: They need to take a decision, based solely on the prior
public likelihood L0. The project will take place iff all players simultaneously approve.
Therefore there exists a symmetric MPE in the simultaneous game, in which all play strategies
with the same threshold x1 = . . . = xn. This equilibrium may not be unique.
The sequential game is apparently different, in that players observe the decisions of others and
adjust their action accordingly. In fact, in a unanimity game, this difference is an illusion: Every
player may assume that others invested, since, if they did not, their own decision does not matter.
Observing that others, in fact, invested, changes nothing.
This shows why every MPE of the sequential game is an MPE of the simultaneous game (but
not vice versa, as Proposition 2 is valid only for the sequential game).
This explains why players may play different thresholds, but it also explains why often all or
some play the same strategy: When the symmetric equilibrium is the only MPE of the simultaneous
game, it must also be the only MPE of the sequential game.
In fact, we can formulate a necessary condition for players to play different strategies.
Proposition 7 (Equal Thresholds). Define
J(x) :=
x
1− x
1− F0(x)
1− F1(x)
7 In MPE, two players play unequal strategies xi 6= xj only if J(x) is not strictly monotonic between
xi and xj. Equivalently, this can happen only when
d log J(x)
dx
=
1
x
+
1
1− x +
f1(x)
1− F1(x) −
f0(x)
1− F0(x)
changes sign between xi and xj.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.5 The General Case: Non-Unanimous Decisions
In the general case, B < n, the fundraising will succeed if at most n − B contributors decline to
invest. There are therefore n
∑n−B
i=0
(
n
i
)
subgames with a positive probability for completion.
Based on the equilibrium characterization (Corollary 3), a solution for equilibrium requires the
solution of simultaneous equations, one for each subgame, each formed as (19). In Section 1 we
7J(x) is often referred to as the hazard rate in survival analysis and in some relevant literature, e.g., in
[Herrera and Ho¨rner, 2012].
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provided a complete solution of the case B ≤ 1, and in Section 4.4 we provided a thorough analysis
of the case B = n. A similar treatment of 1 < B < n is at present beyond our reach, though
we have provided a characterization of its cascades (Section 4.1), and a recurrence relation for the
probability of completion (Section 3.3).
A numerical solution for equilibrium strategies must therefore rely on dynamic programming.
A stumbling block in the analysis is our inability to prove the following, which we conjecture.
Conjecture 5 (pi1 ≥ pi0). Except at irregular states (L,B, n), for every public likelihood L, B
investments outstanding and n players remaining
pi1(L,B, n) ≥ pi0(L,B, n)
with equality only in a cascade or for B ≤ 0.
Conjecture 5 has an immediate consequence on social insurance, namely that in every state in a
sequential fundraising players assume social insurance. Indeed, wherever the conjecture is true, (19)
translates into L x1−x ≤ 1, with equality only for B ≤ 1 or in a cascade. On the other hand, with
the same public likelihood, the last player’s equilibrium strategy x′ satisifies L x
′
1−x′ = 1. Therefore
x ≤ x′.
Corollary 11 (Social Insurance). Let xi be the strategy of player i ∈ [n] in MPE with prior
likelihood L, B investments outstanding and n players remaining. If Conjecture 5 holds, i.e., if
pi1(L,B, n) ≥ pi0(L,B, n), then xi ≤ σ(L, 1, 1) with equality only for the last player or in an up-
cascade.
5 Discussion
5.1 Conclusion
We present and analyze a model of sequential fundraising, and formulate equations satisfied in
equilibrium. We demonstrate, among else, the phenomena of social insurance and delegation, that
threshold strategies are played, and the frequent equality of thresholds. Interesting game-theoretical
aspects include a relation of the solution to the uniqueness of the simultaneous-game equilibrium.
5.2 Future Work
In the general fundraising setting (B ≤ n) many questions remain open. Our Conjecture 5 and its
Corollary 11 await settlement. Some properties of delegation (Theorem 4) are most probably true
in the general case, perhaps all of them.
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We did not investigate some questions, most of which seem difficult: Bounding the probability
of completion, and the threshold values. Do players always play different thresholds when such an
equilibrium is playable? Players often, but not always, play increasingly-high thresholds according
to their order (See Figures 1-4). What rule guides this? An efficient dynamic programming solution
will be useful in investigating the general problem.
A different set of questions is raised when contributors are not statistically equivalent, whether
they come from different quality distributions, or whether their budgets for contribution are dif-
ferent. The main question is: Given a choice, in what order should the fundraiser approach the
potential contributors? This, of course, introduces a new kind of player, and raises the complexity
of the analysis to another level.
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A Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose the player plays S(xi) with probability 1 − , and S(xj) with probability . This
mixed strategy induces a posterior likelihood L+() which limits at the unmixed posterior L1−F1(xi)1−F0(xi)
as → 0. Similarly, piω(L+(), B− 1, n− 1) limits at piω
(
L1−F1(xi)1−F0(xi) , B− 1, n− 1
)
as → 0, since piω
is continuous except at irregular states (Corollary 2).
The pure strategies have the same utility U , so,
U =
L
1 + L
[1− F1(xi)]pi1
(
L
1− F1(xi)
1− F0(xi) , B − 1, n− 1
)− 1
1 + L
[1− F0(xi)]pi0
(
L
1− F0(xi)
1− F0(xi) , B − 1, n− 1
)
=
=
L
1 + L
[1− F1(xj)]pi1
(
L
1− F1(xj)
1− F0(xj) , B − 1, n− 1
)− 1
1 + L
[1− F0(xj)]pi0
(
L
1− F0(xj)
1− F0(xj) , B − 1, n− 1
)
The utility of the mixed strategy, Ui,j(), is
Ui,j() =
L
1 + L
{
(1− )[1− F1(xi)] + [1− F1(xj)]
}
pi1
(
L
1− F1(xi)
1− F0(xi) , B − 1, n− 1
)
− 1
1 + L
{
(1− )[1− F0(xi)] + [1− F0(xj)]
}
pi0
(
L
1− F0(xi)
1− F0(xi) , B − 1, n− 1
)
= (1− )U + 
1 + L
{
L[1− F1(xj)]pi1(L+(), B − 1, n− 1)− [1− F0(xj)]pi0(L+(), B − 1, n− 1)
}
As → 0, maxj 6=i Ui,j()−U → U+D(xi)1+L . Therefore, if D(xi) > D(xk), for a sufficiently small  the
player prefers to maximize the probability of S(xi), choosing to mix it with the strategy of player
arg maxj 6=i Ui,j(), rather than maximize the probability of S(xk), mixed with any strategy.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We shall prove the lemma by showing that the differential of the log of each expression is
positive.
Define φ(x) := f0(x)/(1− x) = f1(x)/x. We show that, for x ∈ (1−Q,Q)
1− F0(x)
1− x <
1− F1(x)
x
(32)
For
1− F0(x)
1− x −
1− F1(x)
x
=
1
1− x
Q∫
x
f0(y)dy − 1
x
Q∫
x
f1(y)dy
=
Q∫
x
1− y
1− xφ(y)dy −
Q∫
x
y
x
φ(y)dy
=
Q∫
x
(1− y
1− x −
y
x
)
φ(y)dy =
Q∫
x
x− y
x(1− x)φ(y)dy < 0
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because the integrand is negative for 0 < x < y < 1.
Therefore
d
dx
log
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) =
f0(x)
1− F0(x) −
f1(x)
1− F1(x) = φ(x)
[ 1− x
1− F0(x) −
x
1− F1(x)
]
> 0
with the last inequality following from (32).
Similarly, we show that, for x ∈ (1−Q,Q)
F0(x)
1− x >
F1(x)
x
(33)
For
F0(x)
1− x −
F1(x)
x
=
1
1− x
x∫
1−Q
f0(y)dy − 1
x
x∫
1−Q
f1(y)dy
=
x∫
1−Q
1− y
1− xφ(y)dy −
x∫
1−Q
y
x
φ(y)dy
=
x∫
1−Q
(1− y
1− x −
y
x
)
φ(y)dy =
x∫
1−Q
x− y
x(1− x)φ(y)dy > 0
because the integrand is positive for 0 < y < x < 1.
Therefore
d
dx
log
F1(x)
F0(x)
=
f1(x)
F1(x)
− f0(x)
F0(x)
= φ(x)
[ x
F1(x)
− 1− x
F0(x)
]
> 0
with the last inequality following from (33)
C Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The inference from investment, substituting (24) and (25) in (17) is
L+(L, x) =

L2(Q−R)−x
2+(1−Q)2
2(Q−R)−Q2+(1−x)2 x ≤ 1−R
L Q+R2−Q−R 1−R ≤ x ≤ R
L Q+x2−Q−x x ≥ R
(34)
By (4), if a cascade is not in progress, a player in the information-cascades setting with public
likelihood L has threshold x for which L = 1−xx . For such a player’s investment to trigger an
up-cascade requires
L
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) ≥
Q
1−Q
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Substituting, an up-cascade needs a solution x ∈ (1−Q,Q) of
H(x) :=
1− x
x
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) ≥
Q
1−Q (35)
First, note that, when R = 1/2, substituting (34) in (35) yields
H(x) =
1− x
x
Q+ x
2−Q− x ≥
Q
1−Q (36)
which has no solutions in (0, 1), so there are no up-cascades when R = 1/2.
For x ≥ R, substituting (34) in (35) also results in (36), so cascades can start only for x < R.
Since H(1−R) > H(x) for every x ∈ [1−R,R], we may restrict the investigation to x ≤ 1−R.
Define
h(Q) :=
1
1 +
√
(1−Q)(1+Q)
Q(2−Q
We shall first show that, for every Q > 1/2, an up-cascade is possible with R = h(Q). Specifically,
a player with threshold 1−R will start it. Since, from (35), R = h(Q) is a solution of
H(1−R) = R
1−R
Q+R
2−Q−R =
Q
1−Q (37)
Now observe that R1−R and
Q+R
2−Q−R are both increasing with R. Therefore, from (37), for every
R ≥ h(Q)
H(1−R) = R
1−R
Q+R
2−Q−R ≥
Q
1−Q
so that cascades occur (and specifically at x = 1−R) for every R ≥ h(Q).
Now we show that cascade do not occur when R < h(Q).
As noted, R1−R
Q+R
2−Q−R is increasing with R, so that, for R < h(Q), at x = 1 − R, H(1 − R) =
R
1−R
Q+R
2−Q−R <
Q
1−Q , so a player with x = 1 − R does not start a cascade. Furthermore, x = 1 −Q
satisfies (35) with equality H(1−Q) = Q1−Q 1−F1(1−Q)1−F0(1−Q) ≥
Q
1−Q . If we could prove that H(x) is convex
between 1−Q and 1−R, it would prove that (35) has no solutions in (1−Q, 1−R], and therefore
no solutions at all for R < h(Q).
By (17), for x ∈ [1−Q, 1−R]
H(x) =
1− x
x
2(Q−R)− x2 + (1−Q)2
2(Q−R)−Q2 + (1− x)2 (38)
For (38), d
2
dx2
H(x) ≤ 0 everywhere in [1−Q, 1−R] (according to Wolfram Alpha). So H(x) is
convex, completing the proof for R < h(Q).
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D Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. An up-cascade can start iff there exists a non-cascade prior likelihood L ∈ (1−QQ , Q1−Q) for
which an investment by a player induces the posterior likelihood above the up-cascade threshold
Q
1−Q . Since when B ≤ 1 a player’s threshold strategy x satisfies L = 1−xx (by (4)), and the posterior
likelihood after investment is L1−F1(x)1−F0(x) , this is conditioned on
1− x
x
1− F1(x)
1− F0(x) ≥
Q
1−Q (39)
Since 1−F1(x)1−F0(x) ≤
Q
1−Q (by Lemma 1 and (13)), for (39) to hold we must have
1−x
x ≥ 1, or x ≤ 12 .
Let xi be a player who delegates, and xj a player who does not. Then, from (27)
L
1−Q
Q
≥ L xi
1− xi =
∏
k∈[n],k 6=i
1− F0(xk)
1− F1(xk) =
∏
k∈[n]
1− F0(xk)
1− F1(xk)
L
xj
1− xj =
∏
k∈[n],k 6=j
1− F0(xk)
1− F1(xk) =
1− F1(xj)
1− F0(xj)
∏
k∈[n]
1− F0(xk)
1− F1(xk)
Combining the above
L
xj
1− xj ≤ L
1−Q
Q
1− F1(xj)
1− F0(xj)
Or
1− xj
xj
1− F1(xj)
1− F0(xj) ≥
Q
1−Q
which is (39) for x = xj . Therefore delegation implies that cascades can start, and all players have
thresholds ≤ 12 , proving items (1) and (2).
The delegation is always by the earliest players, if a delegation strategy always has the best
discriminator specified in (29). Clearly this is true if it is true in any two player game, so let two
players play S(x1) and S(x2), with the first a delegation strategy x1 ≤ 1−Q, and the second not
x2 > 1−Q. Then
D(x1) = L[1− F1(x2)]2 − [1− F0(x2)]2
D(x2) = L[1− F1(x1)]2 − [1− F0(x1)]2 = L− 1
Then, delegating is by the first player if
L[1− F1(x2)]2 − [1− F0(x2)]2 > L− 1 (40)
30
From (27)
L
x2
1− x2 =
1− F0(x1)
1− F1(x1) = 1
I.e., L = 1−x2x2 . Substituting in (40)
1− x2
x2
[1− F1(x2)]2 − [1− F0(x2)]2 > 1− x2
x2
− 1
Or
(1− x2)[1− F1(x2)]2 − x2[1− F0(x2)]2 > 1− 2x2
proving item (3).
Similarly, delegating is always by the last player when
(1− x2)[1− F1(x2)]2 − x2[1− F0(x2)]2 < 1− 2x2
proving item (4).
E Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Let i and j play be two players in an n-unanimity game with prior likelihood L.
Define
M := L
∏n
k=1
1−F1(xk)
1−F0(xk)
1−F1(xi)
1−F0(xi)
1−F1(xj)
1−F0(xj)
Substituting in (19), xi and xj satisfy the system of equations
{
M xi1−xi =
1−F0(xj)
1−F1(xj)
M
xj
1−xj =
1−F0(xi)
1−F1(xi)
Multiplying these two equations
M
xi
1− xi
1− F0(xi)
1− F1(xi) = M
xj
1− xj
1− F0(xj)
1− F1(xj)
But this means J(xi) = J(xj), which, if J(x) is strictly monotonic, implies xi = xj . In a
range where a positive function is strictly monotonic, the derivate of its logarithm does not change
sign.
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